Steven Gross has previously taught at the University of Pennsylvania, Georgetown University, and University College London. He specializes in the philosophy of language, philosophy of mind, and metaphysics.
Secondary appointments in Cognitive Science and in Psychological and Brain Sciences; affiliate faculty, Science of Learning Institute
“Linguistic Intuitions: Error Signals and the Voice of Competence,” in Linguistic Intuitions, Evidence, and Expertise, ed. Samuel Schindler (Oxford University Press, forthcoming).
“Perceptual Consciousness and Cognitive Access from the Perspective of Capacity-Unlimited Working Memory,” Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B 373, 2018.
“Perception and the Origins of Temporal Representation,” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 98, S1, 2017, pp. 275-92.
“Perceptual Consciousness, Short-Term Memory, and Overflow: Replies to Beck, Orlandi and Franklin, and Phillips” (with J. Flombaum), Mind & Language symposium, The Brains Blog, June 2017.
“Does Perceptual Consciousness Overflow Cognitive Access? The Challenge from Probabilistic, Hierarchical Processes” (with J. Flombaum), Mind & Language 32, 2017, pp. 358-91.
“Cognitive Penetrability and Attention,” in Frontiers in Psychology, 22 February 2017, https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2017.00221 (Research Topic “Pre-cueing Effects on Perception and Cognitive Penetrability,” eds. Athanassios Raftopoulos and Gary Lupyan)
“Does the Expressive Role of ‘True’ Preclude Deflationary Davidsonian Semantics?”, in Meaning Without Representation: Essays on Truth, Expression, Normativity, and Naturalism, eds. S. Gross, N. Tebben, and M. Williams (Oxford University Press, 2015), pp. 47-63.
Meaning Without Representation: Essays on Truth, Expression, Normativity, and Naturalism, eds. S. Gross, N. Tebben, and M. Williams (Oxford University Press, 2015), pp. x + 379.
“Descriptive Semantic Externalism,” in The Routledge Handbook of Semantics, ed. N. Riemer (Routledge, 2015), pp. 13-29.
“The Metaphysics of Meaning: Hopkins on Wittgenstein,” International Journal of Philosophical Studies 23, 2015, pp. 518-38.
“Problems for the Purported Cognitive Penetration of Perceptual Color Experience and Macpherson’s Proposed Mechanism” (with T. Chaisilprungraung, E. Kaplan, J. Menendez, and J. Flombaum) in Thought and Perception, eds. E. Machery and J. Prinz (New Prairie Press, 2014), pp. 1-30.
“What is a Context?”, in Perspectives on Pragmatics and Philosophy, eds. A. Capone, F. Lo Piparo, and M. Carapezza (Springer, 2013), pp. 113-32.
“Davidson, First Person Authority, and the Evidence for Semantics,” in Donald Davidson on Truth, Meaning, and the Mental, ed. G. Preyer (Oxford University Press, 2012), pp. 228-48.
“Innateness” (with Georges Rey), in The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Cognitive Science, eds. E. Margolis, R. Samuels, and S. Stich (Oxford University Press, 2012), pp. 318-60.
“Revisited Linguistic Intuitions” (with Jennifer Culbertson), British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 62, 2011, pp. 639-656.
“Knowledge of Meaning, Conscious and Unconscious,” in Meaning, Understanding, and Knowledge, eds. B. Armour-Garb, D. Patterson, and J. Woodbridge (Vol. 5: The Baltic International Yearbook of Cognition, Logic and Communication), 2009, pp. 1-44.
“Are Linguists Better Subjects?” (with Jennifer Culbertson), British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 60, 2009, pp. 721-36.
“Sincerely Saying What You Don’t Believe Again,” Dialectica 62, 2008, pp. 349-54.
“Reply to Jackendoff,” The Linguistic Review 24, 2007, pp. 423-9.
“Relating Conscious and Unconscious Semantic Knowledge,” Croatian Journal of Philosophy 7, 2007, pp. 427-45.
“Trivalent Semantics and the Vaguely Vague,” Synthese 156, 2007, pp. 97-117.
“Can Empirical Theories of Semantic Competence Really Help Limn the Structure of Reality?”, Nous 40, 2006, pp. 43-81.
“Can One Sincerely Say What One Doesn’t Believe?”, Mind & Language 21, 2006, pp. 11-20.
“The Nature of Semantics: On Jackendoff’s Arguments,” The Linguistic Review 22, 2005, pp. 249-270.
“The Biconditional Doctrine: Contra Kölbel on a ‘Dogma’ of Davidsonian Semantics,” Erkenntnis 62, 2005, pp. 189-210.
“Context-Sensitive Truth-Theoretic Accounts of Semantic Competence,” Mind & Language 20, 2005, pp. 68-102.
“Linguistic Understanding and Belief,” Mind 114, 2005, pp. 61-6.
“Putnam, Context, and Ontology,” Canadian Journal of Philosophy 34, 2004, pp. 507-54.
“Vagueness, Indirect Speech Reports, and the World,” Protosociology (Special Issue on Semantic Theory and Reported Speech) 17, 2002, pp. 153-68.
“Is Context-Sensitivity Eliminable? Some Remarks,” The Dialogue (Yearbook of Philosophical Hermeneutics: The Legitimacy of Truth, Proceedings of the Third Meeting, Italian-American Philosophy) 2, 2002, pp. 21-38.
“Putnam, Kontext und Ontologie,” in Hilary Putnam und die Tradition des Pragmatismus, eds. Marie-Luise Raters and Marcus Willaschek (Suhrkamp, 2002), pp. 404-36.
“Vagueness, Indeterminacy, and Uncertainty,” in Indeterminacy, ed. Jose Ciprut (MIT Press, 2008), pp. 129-49.
“Vagueness in Context,” in Proceedings of the 22nd Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society, eds. L. Gleitman and A. Joshi (Lawrence Erlbaum, 2000), pp. 208-13.
Essays on Linguistic Context-Sensitivity and its Philosophical Significance, Studies in Philosophy: Outstanding Dissertations (Routledge, 2001), pp. xvi + 148.
