E.J. Green

E.J. Green

Miller Associate Professor

Contact Information

Research Interests: Philosophy of mind and philosophy of cognitive science, with a primary focus on perception

Education: PhD, Rutgers University

E. J. Green earned his PhD from Rutgers University in 2016. Previously, he spent a year as a postdoc at NYU from 2016-2017 and taught at MIT from 2017-2023. He works at the intersection of philosophy of mind and cognitive science, with a significant focus on perception.

1. Green, E. J. (forthcoming). “A Pluralist Perspective on Shape Constancy.” The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science.

2. Green, E. J. (forthcoming). “Can We Perceive the Past?” To appear in S. Aronowitz & L. Nadel (eds.), Space, Time, and Memory. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

3. Green, E. J. (2023). “The Multisensory Perception of Persistence.” In A. Mroczko-Wąsowicz & R. Grush (eds.), Sensory Individuals: Contemporary Perspectives on Modality-Specific and Multimodal Perceptual Objects. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

4. Green, E. J. (2023). “The Perception-Cognition Border: Architecture or Format?” In B. P. McLaughlin & J. Cohen (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Mind. Oxford: Blackwell.

5. Green, E. J. (2023). “Perceptual Constancy and Perceptual Representation.” Analytic Philosophy. DOI: 10.1111/phib.12293.

6. Green, E. J. (2022). “The Puzzle of Cross-Modal Shape Experience.” Noûs, 56(4), 867-896.

7. Green, E. J. (2022). “Representing Shape in Sight and Touch.” Mind & Language, 37(4), 694-714.

8. Quilty-Dunn, J., & Green, E. J. (2021). “Perceptual Attribution and Perceptual Reference.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. DOI: 10.1111/phpr.12847

9. Green, E. J., & Quilty-Dunn, J. (2021). “What is an Object File?” The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 72(3), 665-699. (Selected as BJPS Editor’s Choice for volume 72, issue 3.)

10. Green, E. J. (2021). “Binding and Differentiation in Multisensory Object Perception.” Synthese, 198, 4457-4491.

11. Green, E. J. (2020). “The Perception-Cognition Border: A Case for Architectural Division.” The Philosophical Review, 129(3), 323-393.

12. Green, E. J., & Rabin, G. (2020). “Spatial Functionalism, Vision Science, and the Case Against Global Skepticism.” Analytic Philosophy, 61(4), 345-378.

13. Green, E. J. (2019). “A Theory of Perceptual Objects.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 99(3), 663-693.

14. Green, E. J. (2019). “On the Perception of Structure.” Noûs, 53(3), 564-592.

15. Green, E. J. (2018). “What Do Object Files Pick Out?” Philosophy of Science, 85(2), 177-200.

16. Green, E. J., & Schellenberg, S. (2018). “Spatial Perception: The Perspectival Aspect of Perception.” Philosophy Compass, 13, e12472.

17. Green, E. J. (2017). “Psychosemantics and the Rich/Thin Debate.” Philosophical Perspectives, 31(1), 153-186.

18. Green, E. J. (2017). “Attentive Visual Reference.” Mind & Language, 32(1), 3-38.

19. Green, E. J. (2017). “A Layered View of Shape Perception.” The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 68(2), 355-387.

20. Green, E. J. (2016). “Representationalism and Perceptual Organization.” Philosophical Topics, 44(2), 121-148.

21. McLaughlin, B. P., & Green, E. J. (2015). “Are Icons Sense Data?” Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 22(6), 1541-1545. Invited commentary on Hoffman, Singh, and Prakash, “The Interface Theory of Perception.”

Reviews and Other Writing

22. Hafri, A., Green, E. J., & Firestone, C. (forthcoming). “Compositionality in Visual Perception.” Behavioral and Brain Sciences.

23. Mandelbaum, E., Dunham, Y., Feiman, R., Firestone, C., Green, E. J., Harris, D., Kibbe, M., Kurdi, B., Mylopoulos, M., Shepherd, J., Wellwood, A., Porot, N., & Quilty-Dunn, J. (2022). “Problems and Mysteries of the Many Languages of Thought.” Cognitive Science, 46, e13225.

24. Green, E. J. (2015). “Review of Uriah Kriegel’s Sources of Intentionality.” Mind, 124(493), 366-370.

Published Abstracts

25. Green, E. J., Singh, Manish, & Feldman, Jacob (2015). “Apparent Motion of Negative Parts.” Journal of Vision, 15(12), 524.